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The Supreme Court’s immigration jurisprudence has little basis in the original meaning of the Constitution. 
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of its past mistakes without overruling a raft of settled precedents. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 992 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT .............................................................. 994 
II.  CONGRESS WEIGHS IN ON THE REGULATION OF ALIENS ................. 997 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT TAKES OVER ............................................. 1000 
IV.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ALTERNATIVE TO THE INHERENT  
POWER THEORY .......................................................................... 1008 
V.  WHAT NOW? ...................................................................................... 1011 
A.  Sanctuaries ............................................................................... 1014 
B.  Anti-Sanctuaries ........................................................................ 1017 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 1023 
 
 
 
 * University Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.  For helpful 
comments, I am grateful to Helen Alvaré, Josh Blackman, Stephen G. Gilles, Jack G. Lund, Mara 
S. Lund, John O. McGinnis, Christopher Mufarrige, and Ilya Somin. 
992 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:4 
INTRODUCTION 
Immigration law is notoriously complex and controversial.  In the 
political arena, there could hardly be a wider range of policy views.  Donald 
Trump, for example, has advocated the deportation of millions of people 
who came here illegally,1 many of whom have presumably been productive 
and law-abiding residents for years, or even decades.  Hillary Clinton, who 
opposed him in the last election, was accused of favoring the diametrically 
opposite position of “open borders.”2  That does not appear to be her 
current position,3 but other politicians advocate policies that would come 
close to effectively opening the borders.4 Perhaps reflecting the political 
salience of the issues, academics who have chosen to immerse themselves in 
 
 1 See, e.g., Benjy Sarlin, Trump Recommits to Mass Deportation in Fiery Immigration Speech, NBC NEWS 
(Sept. 1, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-recommits-
mass-deportation-fiery-immigration-speech-n641016.  Trump’s statements about this issue have 
varied from time to time, but he pretty consistently favored mass deportation policies during his 
presidential campaign. 
 2 In a speech to a private audience in South America, which was disclosed by WikiLeaks, Clinton 
said: “My dream is a hemispheric common market, with open trade and open borders, some time 
in the future with energy that is as green and sustainable as we can get it, powering growth and 
opportunity for every person in the hemisphere.”  What Hillary Clinton Really Said About ‘Open 
Borders,’ THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 20, 2016, 1:47 AM), https://thinkprogress.org/what-hillary-
clinton-really-said-about-open-borders-9c005c2b6d16/.  After this quote was leaked, Clinton 
claimed that she was referring only to cross-border trade in energy.  This would seem to dissolve 
the distinction that everyone else makes between free trade and the open borders that exist within 
the United States and the European Union.  Moreover, the structure of the sentence pretty 
clearly implies that green energy is a distinct part of the dream, not the sole feature of a 
“hemispheric common market.”  Clinton has refused to release a full transcript of the speech, 
which might have resolved whatever ambiguity can be found in the leaked quotation. 
 3 See Patrick Wintour, Hillary Clinton: Europe Must Curb Immigration to Stop Rightwing Populists, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/ 
hillary-clinton-europe-must-curb-immigration-stop-populists-trump-brexit (“I admire the very 
generous and compassionate approaches that were taken particularly by leaders like Angela 
Merkel, but I think it is fair to say Europe has done its part, and must send a very clear message—
‘we are not going to be able to continue provide refuge and support’—because if we don’t deal 
with the migration issue it will continue to roil the body politic.”). 
 4 See, e.g., Press Release, Mark Pocan, U.S. Representative, House of Representatives, Members of 
Congress Introduce Legislation to Terminate ICE and Transfer Critical Functions to Other 
Agencies (July 12, 2018), https://pocan.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/members-of-
congress-introduce-legislation-to-terminate-ice-and-transfer (advocating abolition of the federal 
agency responsible for investigations of immigration violations, apparently because it has not 
focused exclusively on “hardened criminals, gangs and terrorists”); Roque Planas, It’s Time to 
Decriminalize Immigration, Say Top Texas Dems, HUFFPOST, (Aug. 23, 2018, 2:17 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/time-to-decriminalize-immigration-top-texas-
democrats_us_5b7c3985e4b0348585fb0db5?ylo.  The policy that Hillary Clinton has publicly 
forsworn, moreover, has no shortage of proponents.  See, e.g., Bryan Caplan, Why Should We Restrict 
Immigration?, 32 CATO J. 5, 6 (2012) (declaring the existence of a moral presumption in favor of 
open borders and applying a kind of strict scrutiny analysis to laws that restrict immigration); Pro-
Open Borders People, OPEN BORDERS, https://openborders.info/pro-open-borders-people/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019) (listing people who support open borders). 
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this field generally seem to interpret the Constitution and other laws in 
ways that tend to advance their own preferences.  Those preferences run 
pretty strongly against restrictionist policies. 
I am no expert, nor even much of a dabbler, in the intricacies of the 
statutory and regulatory framework.  Nor do I have strong views about 
immigration policy.  Every set of policies, existing and proposed, contains a 
complicated mix of potential costs and benefits to the nation as a whole, 
and to various groups that have conflicting factional interests.  There is also 
considerable uncertainty about how the costs and benefits of various policy 
options would play out over time.  High-decibel moralizing and self-
confident predictions from advocates of various ideological agendas are 
frequently accompanied by fallacious arguments and slogans that are 
unmoored from reality.5  I’ll confess to thinking that the deportation of 
millions of peaceable aliens is no more practicable than it would be 
humane.  But neither do I think that refusing admission to people who 
chanced to be born outside our borders is a grotesque injustice that 
demands correction.6  Identifying the optimal policy mix, which must lie 
somewhere between these poles, is not an achievement to which I can lay 
claim. 
My contribution to this Symposium will focus on broader questions 
involving federalism.  I believe that the Supreme Court’s immigration 
jurisprudence is fundamentally misguided, in the sense that it has little basis 
in the original meaning of the Constitution.  In this Article, I will explain 
why I think so and what the Court might do to ameliorate the effects of its 
past mistakes without overruling a raft of settled precedents. 
Part I analyzes the text of the Constitution, which offers a reasonably 
clear allocation of authority over immigration between the state and federal 
governments.  The Foreign Commerce Clause empowers Congress to limit 
the entry of aliens onto American soil, and the Naturalization Clause 
authorizes Congress to set uniform criteria for admission to American 
citizenship.  Nothing on the face of the Constitution permits Congress to 
displace the states’ residual authority over aliens, which includes the power 
to exclude or expel unsuitable persons from their own territory. 
 
 5 For an accessible and non-ideological introduction to the economics of immigration policy, see 
generally GEORGE J. BORJAS, WE WANTED WORKERS: UNRAVELING THE IMMIGRATION 
NARRATIVE (2016). 
 6 Cf. Ilya Somin, The Hereditary Aristocracy of Citizenship, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 7, 2018, 6:20 
PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/07/07/the-hereditary-aristocracy-of-citizenshi 
(maintaining that citizenship, much like membership in old-time aristocracies, “force[s] many 
people into poverty and oppression based largely on circumstances of birth,” and thus “often 
perpetrates comparably grave injustice”).  In my view, it is unjust to conflate a democratically 
adopted national decision to withhold the privileges of citizenship from outsiders with the 
oppression of a subordinate population by a hereditary political class. 
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Part II reviews early debates in Congress about the scope and nature of 
federal power over immigration.  There were important disagreements, 
some of which resemble today’s policy debates, but Congress generally 
refrained from going much beyond what the text of the Constitution pretty 
clearly authorizes. 
Part III traces the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine.  The Court 
began by rooting federal immigration authority primarily in the Foreign 
Commerce Clause, where it belongs, but then misinterpreted that Clause.  
In the late nineteenth century, the Justices made a dramatic and largely 
unexplained shift to a non-textual theory under which broad federal 
authority over immigration and aliens is treated as an inherent aspect of 
American sovereignty. 
Part IV shows that this doctrinal shift may not have had much practical 
significance.  In non-immigration contexts, the Court eventually 
interpreted the Commerce Clause itself in a way that gave Congress 
practically the same far-reaching authority that the inherent power theory 
bestows in the immigration field.  Thus, even if the Court had stuck with 
the Foreign Commerce Clause as the primary source of federal authority 
over immigration, the result would likely have been much the same as what 
the Court has mistakenly put in its place. 
Part V assumes that the Court is very unlikely to reconsider the well-
established inherent power theory.  In recent decades, however, the Justices 
have been experimenting with doctrinal devices designed to put some limits 
on the almost unlimited Commerce Clause authority that previous cases 
had mistakenly conferred on Congress.  The Article concludes with two 
examples showing how these limiting doctrines can and should be used to 
resolve recent immigration controversies in which some states have desired 
to pursue policy objectives to which federal officials object. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
American federalism, properly understood, rests on two principles that 
are derived from the language and structure of the Constitution.  First, the 
federal government has only those powers that have been delegated to it in 
the Constitution, either expressly or by clear implication.  Second, and 
correlatively, the states possess all powers that have not been taken away 
from them—either expressly or by clear implication—by the Constitution 
or a valid federal law.7  
 
 
 7 For a model of how these principles should be applied, see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 
U.S. 779, 845–926 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Article I, Section 8 does not refer expressly to immigration.  It does 
contain a clause giving Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of 
naturalization, and Congress exercised that power right off the bat in the 
First Congress.8  Naturalization laws can and do affect immigration, and 
the debate about the first naturalization bill in the House resembled today’s 
policy disputes in some respects.  Some legislators, for example, worried 
that too much immigration, especially by the wrong kind of people, would 
be detrimental to the country.9  Others worried that erecting obstacles to 
citizenship would discourage badly needed workers and investors from 
coming to America.10   Accordingly, there were different views about 
whether the path to citizenship should be relatively short and easy or more 
demanding.11 
During that debate, however, no one suggested that the Naturalization 
Clause gave Congress any power to control immigration itself.  For good 
reason.  A rule of naturalization specifies the conditions and procedures 
under which an alien may become a citizen, which has serious implications 
because the Privileges and Immunities Clause curtails the right of state 
governments to exclude or discriminate against citizens from other states.12  
A uniform national rule of naturalization was the obvious way to address 
the negative externalities that could arise if some states naturalized too 
many people, or too many people considered undesirable by other states.13  
This solution has no necessary implication for rules under which aliens may 
be admitted to or excluded from a state’s own territory, or about the 
regulation of their rights and obligations while they are present on her soil.  
The need for federal discretion to control naturalization does not imply a 
need to control immigration, as members of the First Congress 
recognized.14 
 
 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To establish an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization . . . .”); Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). 
 9 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1147–64 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (reporting a House debate on 
naturalization bill). 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and 
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
 13 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 1818). 
 14 Several Members of the First Congress declared that they lacked authority to displace state 
decisions about the substantive rights and privileges of their citizens and objected to a proposal 
imposing residence requirements for holding political offices.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 
9, at 1147–64.  This proposal was dropped, and the enacted statute went so far as to include this 
proviso: “That no person heretofore proscribed by any state, shall be admitted a citizen as 
aforesaid, except by an act of the legislature of the state in which such person was proscribed.”  
1 Stat. at 104. 
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Article I contains another provision that does appear to give Congress a 
general authority over immigration, namely the Foreign Commerce 
Clause.15  The word “commerce” can refer to almost any form of 
intercourse, and the migration of people is not very different from the 
import of goods and services.16  The language of the Migration or 
Importation Clause,17 moreover, plainly covers free persons and indentured 
servants, as well as slaves.18  What would be the point of putting an 
 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations . . . .”). 
 16 One might argue that migration into the country does not qualify as commerce because no 
formal business arrangement is necessarily involved in any particular crossing of the border.  
Migration, however, generally does entail some kind of commercial transaction, such as paying 
somebody to transport or guide the migrant, just as a foreigner who wants to send a gift to 
someone in the United States must ordinarily pay someone to convey the item across our borders.  
Thus, the monopoly law at issue in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), was a regulation 
of interstate commerce, even though some of the ferry passengers who traveled from New Jersey 
to New York may have had non-commercial reasons for making the trip. 
 Even in cases where people simply walk across the border, that act is almost always part of 
an endeavor aimed at consummating commercial exchanges after they enter the United States, 
which would seem to make their migration regulable pursuant to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  If there are isolated cases of migration totally lacking in any commercial element, and 
thus perhaps not covered by a technical reading of the word “commerce” in the Constitution, the 
states would have authority to provide by law for the migrants’ exclusion and expulsion. 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States 
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year 
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, 
not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”). 
 18 It has been asserted, occasionally during the founding period and more commonly since that 
time, that the Migration or Importation Clause applied only to slaves.  There was, however, no 
consensus during the founding period about the existence of an unstated proviso confining this 
clause to the slave trade.  See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 82 
n.572 (2002) (citing comments on both sides of the issue).  If the Framers merely wanted to avoid 
referring expressly to the “peculiar institution,” they could have done so without including the 
word “Migration.”  Chief Justice Marshall made the obvious point about the Constitution’s text:  
Migration applies as appropriately to voluntary, as importation does to involuntary, 
arrivals; and, so far as an exception from a power proves its existence, this section proves 
that the power to regulate commerce applies equally to the regulation of vessels 
employed in transporting men, who pass from place to place voluntarily, and to those 
who pass involuntarily.   
  Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 216–17.  Even if the word “Migration” had been omitted, the constitutional 
language would apparently still not have referred solely to the slave trade.  See Mary Sarah Bilder, 
The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 
761 (1996) (“Indentured servants were simultaneously individuals who increased population and a 
pool of bound labor.  They were considered a commodity; their movement was part of a 
transatlantic commerce. . . . [T]he transportation of indentured servants was generally perceived 
as a commerce of ‘imported’ persons.”). 
 The Federalist is sometimes invoked as support for the slavery-only interpretation.  Writing as 
Publius in Federalist No. 42, Madison said that the Constitution’s power to regulate foreign 
commerce would include a power to prohibit the importation of slaves after 1808.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 13, at 215 (James Madison).  That is indisputable.  But the 
undoubted applicability of the Clause to the slave trade does not imply that it was inapplicable 
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expiration date on this prohibition unless Congress could begin exercising 
its regulatory power at the end of the period?19  And where would this 
power come from, if not from the Foreign Commerce Clause? 
The Foreign Commerce Clause is the most obvious source of 
congressional power to regulate immigration, and nothing on the face of 
the Constitution forbids the states from continuing to exercise the same 
power, as they had been doing before the Constitution was adopted and 
would continue to do for at least twenty years afterward.  The Supremacy 
Clause undoubtedly implies that Congress can preempt such regulations,20 
but that is all it does.  And nothing on the face of the Constitution deprives 
the states of their authority to regulate aliens residing within their borders, 
or even to exclude them from their territory.21 
This straightforward reading of the Constitution’s text may sound 
radically out of step with mainstream thought today.  It is certainly not the 
Supreme Court’s chosen doctrine, and it is probably safe to say that it never 
will be.  But that doesn’t make it wrong, especially when one considers how 
inconsistent the Court itself has been over time and how analytically weak 
and confused the current state of its doctrine is. 
II.  CONGRESS WEIGHS IN ON THE REGULATION OF ALIENS 
Specialists in the field have written detailed studies of America’s 
immigration debates and the tortuous evolution of Supreme Court 
 
elsewhere, and Madison drew no such inference.  He also said the Clause was not “calculated to 
prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America.”  Id. at 217.  This was also 
quite true.  Before 1808, the states had unfettered power to authorize and encourage such 
emigration, and nothing in the Clause suggests that either the states or the general government 
should prevent such commerce from continuing after 1808.  Madison was a careful writer, and a 
careful reading of these passages in The Federalist provides no evidence that the Clause was 
understood to apply only to the slave trade. 
 19 Cf. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 191 (“It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that the exceptions 
from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, to except from a granted 
power, that which was not granted—that which the words of the grant could not comprehend.”). 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 21 In fact, the states continued to exercise a nearly plenary authority over immigration by non-
citizens, as well as over resident aliens, for many decades after the Constitution was adopted.  
From 1788–1789 alone, four states adopted laws banning entry by anyone convicted of a crime.  
During the early nineteenth century, states experimented with a variety of laws designed to 
exclude or expel paupers and people carrying infectious diseases.  States also adopted a variety of 
laws regulating or forbidding the migration of slaves and free blacks.  See GERALD L. NEUMAN, 
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 11–
12, 19–43 (1996). 
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doctrine, which I will not attempt to replicate.22  It will suffice to touch here 
on a few of the most important historical and jurisprudential moments. 
The first significant debate about the regulation of aliens came in 1798, 
in what was also the first great national controversy about federalism.23  
The context was an undeclared and politically divisive naval war with 
France.  Congress was dominated by Federalists, who pushed through 
several bills that purported to strengthen national security.24  Jeffersonians 
strongly opposed the Adams Administration’s hostility toward the French 
Revolution and saw the new laws as devices for suppressing domestic 
political dissent.25  Indeed, the Jeffersonians thought the Federalists were 
trying to destroy their political party, and they fought back with vigor.26  
The intensity of the opposition to these Alien and Sedition Acts was so 
strong that Madison and Jefferson induced the legislatures of Virginia and 
Kentucky, respectively, to declare some of them unconstitutional and to 
urge resistance against their enforcement.27  That storm passed, as one 
hopes that today’s divisive debates will also subside.  I will focus here on 
certain legal questions raised by these controversial statutes. 
There were two Alien Acts.  The Alien Enemies Act generated little 
controversy at the time, and it remains on the books in a slightly modified 
form today.28  This statute authorized the President to deport citizens or 
subjects of a nation with which we were at war.29  It would be hard to deny 
that this is a necessary and proper means of carrying out the war powers 
expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress and the President.  Even 
the Jeffersonians in Congress ended up supporting this bill.30 
The so-called Alien Friends Act presented a tougher case.31  This statute 
gave the President virtually unfettered authority to deport any resident 
alien he judged to be dangerous to the peace and safety of the nation.32   
The House of Representatives conducted an extended debate about which 
 
 22 A useful study of materials bearing on my topic can be found in Cleveland, supra note 18, at 81–
163. 
 23 Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 927 (1991).  
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 928. 
 26 Id. 
 27 THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES 398–400 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 2002). 
 28 Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)). 
 29 Id. 
 30 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–
1801, at 255 (1997) (“Republicans sputtered over the vagueness of the alien enemies bill when it 
was first introduced but did not attack it in principle, and it was they who finally insisted on its 
enactment once some of its more objectionable features were withdrawn.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 31 Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570. 
 32 Id. 
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provision of the Constitution, if any, authorized the bill.33  Proponents 
offered a number of theories about the constitutional basis for the 
deportation power which ranged from the dubious to the borderline 
absurd. 
One seemingly plausible suggestion relied on the Foreign Commerce 
Clause, whose plain language allows the exclusion of aliens.  But how does 
that imply authority to expel aliens after they have become lawful residents?  
One Member defended the bill on the ground that foreigners generally 
came here for commercial purposes, but that claim was rebutted with the 
observation that the bill did not regulate merchants as such, and that it had 
nothing to do with how commerce was carried on.34 
Another colorable argument was that the bill represented a reasonable 
extension of the principle that justified the Alien Enemy Act.  Aliens from 
nations with which we are not at war, or not yet at war, might be just as 
dangerous as people who are technically enemy aliens.35  No doubt, but the 
same could be said of slaves.36  If all of the slaves were subject to 
deportation at the discretion of Congress, the abolition of slavery could 
have been accomplished by an act of the national legislature.  Nobody 
thought that would be constitutional.  An even more outlandish argument 
rested on references to the general welfare in the Preamble and in the 
Taxation Clause.37  Such theories make the enumeration of powers in 
Article I sheer surplusage, and would have authorized just about anything, 
including for example the abolition of slavery.38 
Finally, in an argument completely detached from the text of the 
Constitution, an inherent federal power to expel aliens was conjured out of 
the nature of government.39  This may be the most far-fetched argument of 
them all since it evades the obligation to show that the power was given to 
the federal government rather than left with the states.  It is also the very 
argument on which the Supreme Court eventually settled, as we shall see. 
 
 
 33 There was also debate about whether the measure violated the civil rights of aliens and whether it 
delegated too much discretion to the President.  I leave these issues aside in order to focus on the 
principles of federalism. 
 34 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1958, 1974–75 (1798) (Joseph Gales ed., 1851). 
 35 Id. at 1986–87.  The Sedition Act was defended by John Marshall and others with a similar 
argument.  See Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 136–39 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); Kurt T. Lash & Alicia 
Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 
435 (2007).  That is a sign of the seductiveness of such arguments, not of their soundness. 
 36 8 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 34, at 1996. 
 37 Id. at 1969. 
 38 Id. at 1968. 
 39 Id. at 1969–70. 
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The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions very plausibly denied that the 
federal government had been delegated authority to displace the states’ 
power over resident aliens during peacetime.40  The Alien Friends Act was 
apparently never enforced, and it expired in 1800.  In the following 
decades, Congress did next to nothing in the way of regulating immigration 
(except for outlawing the slave trade) or resident aliens (outside the 
naturalization context).  This left the states free to adopt regulations of their 
own, including laws that excluded undesirable aliens, and the states did 
exactly that.41 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT TAKES OVER 
The law might have been left right there, which is where the text of the 
Constitution seems to put it.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court embarked 
on one of its weirder jurisprudential journeys, which created what we know 
as the dormant or negative commerce power, and eventually what is known 
as the inherent power doctrine. 
Gibbons v. Ogden drew the plausible inference that Congress has plenary 
authority to regulate commerce, “that is, to prescribe the rule by which 
commerce is to be governed.  This power, like all others vested in Congress, 
is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the 
constitution.”42  This was almost enough to answer the constitutional 
question posed by the Gibbons case: because the Court interpreted a federal 
statute (however dubiously) to preempt New York’s ferry boat monopoly, 
this inference effectively decided the issue.43  Many questions were left open 
about the line dividing commerce internal to a state from interstate and 
foreign commerce and about the reach of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  Some of those questions have proved to be very challenging.  But 
few serious questions need ever have arisen about the authority of the states 
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce in the absence of a preemptive 
federal law. 
The text of the Constitution answers that question with about as much 
clarity as one could hope for.  Why would one even think that the 
 
 40 THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 27, at 399–400. 
 41 NEUMAN, supra note 21, at 19–43. 
 42 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). 
 43 Justice Johnson argued, quite persuasively in my view, that New York’s statute was not preempted 
by the federal law on which Chief Justice Marshall relied.  Johnson therefore could not avoid the 
question of state power to regulate interstate commerce, as Marshall did.  He answered the 
question with an extensive argument in favor of interpreting the Commerce Clause to grant an 
exclusive power to Congress.  Id. at 222–40 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
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Constitution took this power away from the states?  The Framers were 
quite capable of assigning certain powers exclusively to the federal 
government.  Article I, for example, gives Congress the power to “exercise 
exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” over the district established as 
the seat of government.44  Similarly, the Constitution expressly prohibits the 
states from exercising certain powers that are given to the federal 
government, such as making treaties, coining money, and emitting bills of 
credit.45  Some powers, moreover, may be exercised by the states only with 
the consent of Congress.46  The text of the Constitution uses none of these 
locutions to abolish or limit the preexisting authority of the states over 
interstate and foreign commerce.  Nor does the Constitution give Congress 
a power to establish “uniform” laws on this subject, which might at least 
have suggested that once Congress enters the field the states are implicitly 
ousted from it.47 
Unfortunately, Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons contains some obiter dicta 
to the effect that the following argument has “great force”: 
[T]hat, as the word ‘to regulate’ implies in its nature, full power over the 
thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others that 
would perform the same operation on the same thing. That regulation is 
designed for the entire result, applying to those parts which remain as they 
were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, 
which is as much disturbed and deranged by changing what the regulating 
power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has operated.48 
Whatever force such an argument might have had in a case dealing 
with the Constitution’s provisions conferring power to establish a 
“uniform” rule of naturalization or “uniform” laws on bankruptcies, it has 
no force at all as an inference based entirely on the word “regulate.”  Nor 
has the Court ever accepted the argument to which Marshall attributed 
“great force.” 
Some Justices have argued, a bit more plausibly, that the purpose of the 
Commerce Clause implies that the states must be deprived of a concurrent 
regulatory power.  That purpose is usually understood as the prevention of 
friction among the states, or the prevention of economic protectionism, or 
both.49  Apart from the lack of support for an inference of exclusivity in the 
 
 44 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added). 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 2–3. 
 47 That would not by any means be a necessary inference, as the Supreme Court recognized at an 
early date with respect to the bankruptcy power.  See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
122 (1819) (holding that the congressional power to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States” is concurrent rather than exclusive).  But at least it 
would have been an inference with some connection to the Constitution. 
 48 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 209 (emphasis added). 
 49 See, e.g., id. at 222–40 (Johnson, J., concurring); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 
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text of the Constitution, the arguments resting on the purpose of the Clause 
are manifestly fallacious.  The Constitution contains two other provisions 
that allow those very purposes to be achieved without any assistance from a 
judicially concocted dormant commerce power.  First, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV forbids the states from engaging in much 
of the behavior that has so concerned those who have thought the states 
require judicial supervision.  Second, whatever is left over could easily be 
addressed through congressional exercise of the regulatory authority 
actually provided in the Commerce Clause. 
Although the Court never adopted the exclusivity theory alluded to in 
Gibbons, another dictum from that case had more influence, at least for a 
while.  Acknowledging that the states undoubtedly retain authority over an 
immense mass of legislation dealing with such things as health, 
transportation, and local commerce, Marshall suggested that they might 
sometimes use the so-called police power to do just what Congress can do 
under the Commerce Clause:50   
All experience shows, that the same measures, or measures scarcely 
distinguishable from each other, may flow from distinct powers; but this 
does not prove that the powers themselves are identical.  Although the 
means used in their execution may sometimes approach each other so 
nearly as to be confounded, there are other situations in which they are 
sufficiently distinct to establish their individuality.51 
This principle enabled the Court to avoid resolving the exclusivity issue 
in Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.52 and New York v. Miln.53  Miln 
deserves special attention here because it upheld a state immigration law 
which required the master of a vessel to give local officials a list with the 
names and other information about all passengers being brought into the 
City of New York.  Justice Barbour’s majority opinion stressed that “a state 
has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and 
things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation; where that 
jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of the 
United States.”54  Gibbons had expressly approved local inspection laws that 
protected against tainted goods, and Miln recognized an equal right of the 
states to guard against the moral or economic pestilence of paupers, 
vagabonds, and convicts.55  
 
525, 532–36 (1949); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
 50 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203–04. 
 51 Id. at 204. 
 52 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (relying, implicitly, on a police power justification to uphold a state law 
that authorized the building of a dam that obstructed a navigable waterway of the United States). 
 53 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 132–133 (1837). 
 54 Id. at 139. 
 55 Id. at 142–43; see also id. at 132 (“We shall not enter into any examination of the question whether 
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Two subsequent cases featured vigorous but inconclusive skirmishes 
about the exclusivity issue.56  In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,57 the Court finally 
put the general theory to rest.  The case involved a state law requiring the 
use of local pilots in the Port of Philadelphia.  This was undoubtedly a 
regulation of navigation and, thus, a regulation of interstate and foreign 
commerce under Gibbons.  Rather than pretend that the law was actually an 
exercise of the police power, and that this case was distinguishable from 
Gibbons, which would have been hard to do with a straight face, Justice 
Curtis invented a whole new theory.  Subjects of the federal commerce 
power that are “in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform 
system . . . require exclusive legislation by Congress.”58  The local pilot law 
at issue was upheld because the Court concluded that a diversity of rules 
was needed to deal with the peculiarities of navigation in various ports.59 
This theory has no basis in the text of the Constitution, which does not 
distinguish between “national” commerce and “local interstate” commerce 
or “local foreign” commerce.  By liberating constitutional doctrine from the 
Constitution’s text (and its history as well), the Court empowered itself to 
become an almost unfettered arbiter of the extent to which state 
governments would be allowed to govern anything that can be 
characterized as commerce.  Cooley even went so far as to proclaim that 
Congress is forbidden to give states the privilege of regulating “national” 
interstate and foreign commerce.60  Although the Court later relented on 
this issue,61 its own power has not been much reduced as a practical matter. 
 
 
the power to regulate commerce, be or be not exclusive of the states, because the opinion which 
we have formed renders it unnecessary: in other words, we are of opinion that the act is not a 
regulation of commerce, but of police; and that being thus considered, it was passed in the 
exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to the states.”). 
 Justice Story’s lone dissent maintained, quite correctly, that if a regulation like the one at 
issue in this case had been adopted by Congress, it would have been authorized by the Commerce 
Clause.  That becomes irrelevant once one accepts Marshall’s statement in Gibbons that the same 
or very similar actions can be taken pursuant to the federal commerce power and the states’ 
police power.  In a shockingly blatant mischaracterization of the public record, however, Story 
maintained that this rendered the New York statute unconstitutional because Chief Justice 
Marshall had resolved the exclusivity issue in Gibbons.  See id. at 158 (Story, J., dissenting).  He 
even went so far as to maintain that Marshall, who had died while Miln was pending before the 
Court, agreed that Gibbons had adopted the exclusivity theory.  Id. at 161. 
 56 Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).  
Although several Justices addressed the exclusivity issue in their opinions, there was no majority 
opinion in either case. 
 57 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
 58 Id. at 319. 
 59 Id. at 319–20. 
 60 See id. at 318. 
 61 See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
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With respect to typical commercial activities, the Justices eventually 
erected a Rube Goldberg dormant commerce contraption that continues to 
divide the Justices and to baffle anyone who tries to make sense of their 
jurisprudence.62  With respect to immigration, however, they took a 
somewhat different path. 
The first step was to use Cooley’s theory to create a new rule of federal 
exclusivity for some immigration cases.  Miln had upheld a state 
immigration regulation as a valid exercise of the police power, and Cooley’s 
immediate effect was therefore to extend protection for state prerogatives 
even to certain regulations of interstate commerce itself.  Henderson v. Mayor 
of New York,63 however, deployed the judicial discretion inherent in the 
Cooley test to go in the opposite direction.  The Court now invoked Cooley to 
invalidate a state law that addressed the threat of indigent immigrants by 
requiring shipowners to post a bond or pay a fee for each passenger 
brought into the state.64  It was clear, thought the Court, that the laws 
governing the right to land passengers from other countries ought to be the 
same in all American ports, and it was unclear whether the states have a 
right to do anything at all to protect themselves from undesirable 
immigrants if Congress does not do it for them.65 
Simultaneously, Chy Lung v. Freeman66 struck down a California statute 
that required a bond from a ship’s owner or master when a state inspector 
suspected specific immigrants of having undesirable traits such as lunacy, 
physical handicaps, criminal records, or bad morals.  In this case, the Court 
at least offered a reason for disabling the states from screening immigrants: 
“[O]therwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous 
quarrels with other nations.”67  In neither Henderson nor Chy Lung, however, 
did the Court explain why the Constitution does not trust Congress to use 
its unquestioned Commerce Clause power to prevent the bad effects that so 
worried the Justices.  This should be no surprise as there is nothing in the 
Constitution that evinces such mistrust.  These cases thus confirm that the 
Cooley theory was not only unmoored from the Constitution’s text but also 
 
 62 For a review, see Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259–65 
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  For recent examples of the 
continuing confusion, see, for example, United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) or C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). 
 63 92 U.S. 259 (1875). 
 64 Id. at 272–73. 
 65 Id. at 273, 275. 
 66 92 U.S. 275 (1875). 
 67 Id. at 280.  Once again, the Court expressed doubt about the right of states to do anything to 
protect themselves from undesirable immigrants and stressed that, even if such a right exists, it 
“can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of 
that necessity.”  Id. 
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unchained from the most basic principles of enumerated and separated 
powers. 
Those structure-of-government principles were soon weakened in a 
different way.  Chy Lung’s allusion to foreign relations provided the Court’s 
very odd rationale for exercising a power given by the Constitution not to 
the judiciary but to Congress.  In Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese 
Exclusion Case),68 the Court addressed the flip side, pointing to foreign 
relations as the reason for construing congressional authority over aliens 
very broadly.  The California Gold Rush had attracted immigrants from 
countries around the world, including China.  In 1868, the United States 
entered into a treaty with China for other reasons, and Congress 
subsequently enacted implementing legislation that regulated the treatment 
of Chinese nationals in America.69  By 1878, Congress was coming under 
tremendous political pressure to curtail the numbers of Chinese on the west 
coast.70  Most of them were unmarried men who worked as laborers, often 
underbidding their domestic competitors, and they were thought to be 
unwilling to assimilate into American life.  Congress finally enacted a 
statute providing, among other things, that certain Chinese nationals who 
went back to China would not be readmitted to the United States, even if 
they had been given certificates authorizing their reentry when they left.71 
Chae Chan Ping found that this statute contravened express provisions of 
the 1868 treaty, but held that Congress has the authority to repeal or 
modify treaties whenever it sees fit, just as it may repeal or modify 
statutes.72  The Court might then have upheld the statute as a regulation of 
foreign commerce, which it obviously was.  Instead, the Court suggested 
that the power to exclude aliens is an aspect of sovereignty that the federal 
government must possess because the United States is a sovereign nation. 
That the government of the United States, through the action of the 
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition 
which we do not think open to controversy.  Jurisdiction over its own 
territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation.  It is a 
part of its independence.  If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that 
extent subject to the control of another power. . . . 
While under our Constitution and form of government the great mass of 
local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their 
relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, 
invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of 
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence 
 
 68 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 69 Cleveland, supra note 18, at 112–16. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Chae Chan Ping, 92 U.S. at 609. 
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and security throughout its entire territory.  The powers to declare war, 
make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign 
commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit 
subjects of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted 
in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public 
policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized 
nations.73 
One might try reading this passage to mean no more than that the 
enumerated powers of Congress convey the authority to exclude aliens 
from the United States.  This would be wishful thinking.  The list of 
sovereign powers with which the passage concludes contains items that 
have nothing to do with immigration, and the Court does not attribute the 
exclusion power to any specific constitutional provisions.  Much of the 
opinion, moreover, is occupied with establishing the proposition that the 
exclusion power is an aspect of sovereignty under international law.  The 
sovereign American states no doubt possessed that power before the 
Constitution was adopted, but whether this (or any other) aspect of 
sovereignty remains with the states, or was delegated to the new federal 
government, is a question to which international law is hardly dispositive, if 
it is even relevant. 
One might argue that the Court’s verbiage amounts to little more than 
harmless error because it is so obvious that the regulation at issue in Chae 
Chan Ping was a valid exercise of the foreign commerce power.  The last 
paragraph of the Court’s opinion seems to offer some support for this 
reading because it distinguishes the challenged statute (which involved 
exclusion of aliens) from the 1798 Alien Friends Act, which involved expulsion, 
and notes that the constitutionality of the latter statute had been challenged 
“by men of great ability and learning.”74  In Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
however, the Court declared that the “absolute and unqualified” right to 
expel aliens rests on the same ground as the right to exclude.75  Even more 
clearly than in Chae Chan Ping, the Court rested its holding entirely on a 
theory of sovereignty associated with international law and completely 
detached from the constitutional principle of limited and enumerated 
powers. 
The general principles of public law which lie at the foundation of these 
cases are clearly established by previous judgments of this court, and by the 
authorities therein referred to. 
 
 73 Id. at 603–04; see also id. at 609 (“The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of 
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers 
delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the 
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on 
behalf of any one.” (emphasis added)). 
 74 Id. at 610. 
 75 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893). 
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In the recent case of Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659, 
the court, in sustaining the action of the executive department, putting in 
force an act of Congress for the exclusion of aliens, said ‘It is an accepted 
maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as 
inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the 
entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such 
cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.  In the United 
States, this power is vested in the national government, to which the 
Constitution has committed the entire control of international relations, in 
peace as well as in war.  It belongs to the political department of the 
government, and may be exercised either through treaties made by the 
President and Senate, or through statutes enacted by Congress.’  
. . . .  
The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are 
vested by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations, 
and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control 
and to make it effective.  The only government of this country, which other 
nations recognize or treat with, is the government of the Union, and the 
only American flag known throughout the world is the flag of the United 
States.76 
This doctrine has been repeatedly reaffirmed.  As the Court recently put it:  
The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over 
the subject of immigration and the status of aliens. This authority rests, in 
part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish an 
uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ and its inherent power as sovereign to 
control and conduct relations with foreign nations.77 
The Court never explained why it shifted from the Commerce Clause 
to this inherent power theory based on international law.  But the shift is 
now so firmly embedded in the case law that the principle of limited and 
enumerated federal powers seems beyond recovery.78 
 
 76 Id. at 704–05, 711. 
 77 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394–95 (2012) (internal citations omitted) (citing Toll v. 
Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); then quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
 78 As Henderson indicated even before the inherent power theory was adopted, the Court appears to 
regard authority over immigration as exclusively federal.  For an argument that this should be 
treated as a question that is still open, and that classic values of federalism should be operable, see 
Claire Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 
(2008). 
 The much-criticized “plenary power doctrine,” which is a kind of offshoot of the inherent 
power theory, has been used to limit the individual constitutional rights available to aliens.  The 
Supreme Court’s decisions have been trending away from this theory of absolute power in the 
context of individuals, but not in the context of the rights of states.  See Alina Das, Administrative 
Constitutionalism in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485, 496, 496 n.46 (2018).  One commentator 
suggests that the Court has adopted an especially aggressive preemption approach in the 
immigration context as a substitute in part for a stronger equal protection doctrine that would 
give illegal aliens more protection.  Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 
(2013). 
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IV.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ALTERNATIVE TO THE INHERENT POWER 
THEORY  
Perhaps the Court’s repudiation of the structural Constitution has made 
no practical difference.  If the Justices had continued to look primarily to 
the Commerce Clause as the source of authority for immigration 
regulations, as they did until the late nineteenth century,79 they might still 
have ended up with a jurisprudence effectively indistinguishable from what 
they have erected on the basis of the inherent power fiction.  The inherent 
power theory was adopted at a time when the Court was attempting to 
develop interstate commerce doctrines that would put meaningful limits on 
congressional power to displace the regulatory authority of the states.80  
Perhaps the Justices were more reluctant to interfere with congressional 
discretion in a context that might have implications for our foreign 
relations.81  In the end, however, the Court wound up in pretty much the 
same place with respect to ordinary commerce as it did with respect to 
immigration. 
The Court’s experiments with limitations on the commerce power were 
not successful.  This case law never came close to generating an analytically 
elegant doctrine, let alone one that could stand up against the political 
forces driving Congress to regulate more and more of American life.  
Beginning with several famous decisions associated with the New Deal, the 
Court appeared for many decades to have conferred a general police power 
on Congress. 
If a small business buys and sells products across state lines, that’s all it 
takes to justify congressional regulation of labor relations within the 
company.82  The federal government can decide how much workers must 
be paid and how long they may work, so long as their employer produces 
goods destined for another state.83  Limits can be put on the crops a farmer 
may grow, even for his own use, if such use by enough farmers could affect 
 
 79 I say “primarily” because some regulations can no doubt be justified under other provisions of the 
Constitution, as the 1798 Alien Enemies Act was.  The federal government’s general 
responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations, however, cannot create a general power to 
regulate resident aliens for the same reason that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not justify 
the Alien Friends and Sedition Acts of 1798.  Cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008) 
(refusing to preempt state law limits on successive habeas corpus petitions that were alleged to 
conflict with American treaty obligations and with the President’s discretion to manage the 
nation’s foreign relations). 
 80 See e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 
(1898); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 
(1879); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. 41 (1870). 
 81 See Cleveland, supra note 18, at 133–34. 
 82 NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937). 
 83 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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the price of farm products in other states.84  The commerce power can be 
used to ban racial discrimination at any small business that uses products 
from another state or serves customers from other states.85  A local loan 
shark can be prosecuted under federal law because some other loan sharks 
belong to gangs that have interstate operations.86  Good luck finding 
anyone who does much of anything that isn’t also done by some interstate 
enterprise, or couldn’t affect interstate commerce if enough people did it. 
In 1995, the Supreme Court’s Lopez decision shocked the legal world by 
finding that Congress had exceeded its Commerce Clause authority when it 
criminalized the possession of a firearm in or near a school.87   The Court 
concluded that the law had nothing to do with commerce or any sort of 
economic activity, and that the conduct it regulated could not substantially 
affect interstate commerce through repetition elsewhere.88  Five years later, 
the Court reviewed a statute that created a civil cause of action for victims 
of “gender-motivated violence,” and held that Congress may not regulate 
violent criminal conduct solely because of the aggregate effect of such 
conduct on interstate commerce.89 
Lopez did not purport to overrule any prior decisions, and the opinion 
raised more questions about the scope of the commerce power than it 
answered.  But because the Court had finally identified something that is 
beyond Congress’s reach, many observers hoped or feared that the decision 
signaled a coming restoration of the principle of limited and enumerated 
federal powers.90  Soon enough, however, any such expectations proved to 
have been misplaced.  Congress reenacted the gun-free school zone law, 
along with a new provision requiring prosecutors to prove that the firearm 
had at some time traveled in interstate commerce.91  Lopez had signaled that 
this was one way for the legislature to convert a local activity into one that 
Congress could regulate, and the new statute has been upheld.92  If an 
object acquires a magical power to subject anyone who possesses it to the 
regulatory jurisdiction of Congress, merely because the object crossed state 
lines at some time in the past, the Constitution’s principle of enumerated 
 
 84 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 85 Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
 86 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
 87 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 88 Id. at 561–63. 
 89 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 90 See Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533 (1995); Symposium, 
The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 633 (1996). 
 91 See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012). 
 92 United States v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 
(8th Cir. 1999). 
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powers is not much more than a guideline for drafting statutes.93 
Congress has not yet reenacted the sexual violence statute, but it 
apparently need only add a requirement that a plaintiff prove some kind of 
interstate nexus.  Perhaps the defendant had moved across a state line to 
attend college.94  Or perhaps he committed the tort while wearing clothing 
manufactured in another state or containing materials from out of state.  
Or perhaps he drove to the scene of the tort in an automobile containing 
parts manufactured out of state. 
In addition to the interstate-nexus gambit, Lopez also alluded to 
regulations forming an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the 
intrastate activity is regulated.95  This was the basis on which a federal 
regulation controlling the consumption of home-grown agricultural 
products had previously been upheld, and the Court extended its reach by 
applying it to marijuana grown and consumed in a state that specifically 
authorized use of the plant for medical purposes.96 
So far, the Court has recognized only trivial or symbolic limits on the 
reach of the Commerce Clause.  In NFIB v. Sebelius,97 for example, five 
Justices, including Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that the Commerce 
Clause does not authorize Congress to force consumers to participate in 
commerce by purchasing specified kinds of health insurance policies that 
they don’t want.  But Roberts then joined the four who dissented from this 
conclusion in upholding the program anyway.  The legal mandate to 
purchase health insurance, which was enforced by what the statute called a 
“penalty,” was converted by the Court into a mere suggestion, and the 
penalty was dubbed a tax that consumers were free to avoid by engaging in 
the kind of commerce Congress wanted to stimulate.98  Roberts’ opinion 
acknowledged that the only reason to interpret the mandate-plus-penalty as 
a voluntarily incurred tax was to avoid holding it unconstitutional.99  To 
complete the farce, he waved away serious arguments that such a tax would 
be subject to the Constitution’s apportionment requirement with the 
 
 93 Cf. United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the sale of body 
armor in interstate commerce creates a sufficient nexus between possession of the body armor 
and commerce to allow for federal regulation under the Commerce Clause).  A petition for 
certiorari was denied in this case, over the dissent of Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia).  
562 U.S. 1163 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 94 Cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (noting that in that case there was “no indication that [the defendant] 
had recently moved in interstate commerce”). 
 95 Id. at 561. 
 96 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 97 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 98 Id. at 561–74. 
 99 Id. 
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question-begging comment that the Court had not previously recognized a 
category of direct taxes that would include this unprecedented kind of 
tax.100 
V.  WHAT NOW? 
Although the Supreme Court has been unwilling to recognize any 
meaningful limits on the scope of congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause, it has used other techniques to preserve a modest 
sphere of state autonomy.  Nothing about the Court’s inherent power 
theory should prevent those doctrines from being adapted and applied in 
the immigration field. 
Consider, for example, the regulation of the states themselves.  Well 
before Lopez, the Court had repeatedly confronted questions about 
congressional power to regulate the wages and hours of state and local 
employees.  The federal government had engaged in such regulation of 
private businesses since the New Deal, and Congress began extending 
coverage to various categories of state employees in the 1960s.  In Maryland 
v. Wirtz,101 the Court upheld the new regulations as a valid exercise of the 
commerce power.  In 1976, National League of Cities v. Usery102 overruled 
Wirtz and sought to articulate a legal test that would limit congressional 
power over the states.  In 1985, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority103 overruled National League of Cities, holding that Congress has the 
same extensive authority to regulate the states and their subdivisions that 
the Court has given it over private employers.  In response to the majority’s 
insistence that the states must rely on the political process for protection 
against federal overreaching, four Justices vigorously dissented.  They 
refused to acquiesce in what Justices Powell and O’Connor characterized as 
an abdication of judicial responsibility,104 or to rely on what Justice 
O’Connor wryly called Congress’s “underdeveloped capacity for self-
restraint.”105 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 392 U.S. 183 (1968). 
 102 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). 
 103 469 U.S. 528, 531, 556 (1985). 
 104 Id. at 567 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for 
assessing the constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties theoretically 
are able to look out for their own interests through the electoral process.”); id. at 581 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“If federalism so conceived and so carefully cultivated by the Framers of our 
Constitution is to remain meaningful, this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility 
to oversee the Federal Government’s compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate interests of 
the States.”). 
 105 Id. at 588 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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A few years later, Gregory v. Ashcroft106 created a new canon of statutory 
construction designed to restore some protection for the states from federal 
regulation.  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion suggested that Garcia 
should not be considered settled law, but it refrained from overruling it.107 
Instead, the Court adopted a clear-statement rule under which federal 
regulatory statutes will be deemed to apply to the states only when the text 
does so without the slightest ambiguity.108  This interpretive rule reduces 
the likelihood that Congress will casually or inadvertently regulate the 
states, and makes it more difficult for courts and executive agencies to find 
authority for regulations that Congress did not affirmatively enact. 
In another post-Garcia development, the Court has developed an “anti-
commandeering” doctrine that forbids Congress to require states to assist in 
the administration of federal regulatory programs.  New York v. United 
States109 and Murphy v. NCAA110 held that state legislatures may not be 
ordered either to enact or refrain from enacting laws.  Printz v. United 
States111 applied the anti-commandeering principle to protect state executive 
officials from being ordered to administer federal regulatory programs.  
The doctrine discourages Congress from displacing the regulatory authority 
of the states because it will often be costlier, in financial and political terms, 
for the federal government to impose and administer a program itself than 
to conscript the states as its agents. 
A third doctrine involves conditional grants to the states.  The Supreme 
Court has held that Congress may spend money in the pursuit of the 
general welfare, whether or not the spending would be authorized by any of 
the specific grants of legislative power in Article I.112  To call this doctrine 
dubious would be an understatement.  Writing as Publius in The Federalist, 
Madison explained with his customary incisiveness why this conclusion is 
inconsistent with the text of the Constitution and why it would subvert the 
Constitution’s use of enumeration to limit congressional power.113  What is 
 
 106 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 107 Id. at 464. 
 108 Id. at 460–61, 467. 
 109 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 110 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
 111 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
 112 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66, 68 (1936).  After endorsing this general proposition, 
the Court then declared: “We are not now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase ‘general 
welfare of the United States’ or to determine whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls 
within it.  Wholly apart from that question, another principle embedded in our Constitution 
prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.  The act invades the reserved rights 
of the states.”  Id. at 68.  The Court did not explain how these putative rights could have been 
reserved to the states except through the absence in the Constitution of a delegation to Congress 
of a power to aid agriculture. 
 113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra note 13, at 213–15 (James Madison). 
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often mislabeled as the Spending Clause gives Congress powers of taxation; 
it says nothing about spending, and its reference to the general welfare 
refers only to a purpose for which the taxation power may be exercised.  
The power to spend money actually arises from the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, and thus must be anchored in some other specific constitutional 
authorization. 
The Court’s misinterpretation of the spending power complements its 
nearly total abandonment of restrictions on congressional regulatory power 
under the Commerce Clause.  But as with the anti-commandeering 
doctrine and Gregory’s clear-statement rule, the Court has at least 
recognized the need to inhibit the legislature from casually displacing state 
authority.  One way that Congress puts pressure on the states to adopt 
federal policies is through conditional grants: offers of money that come 
with provisos requiring recipient states to comply with federal dictates.  The 
Court has tried in various ways to reduce the temptation for abuse of this 
lever.  As South Dakota v. Dole noted, if Congress places conditions on grants 
to the states, it “must do so unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the States to 
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their 
participation.”114  Another potentially powerful restraint is that the 
conditions must be related to the federal interest in whatever is being 
funded.115 
The Foreign Commerce Clause is fairly read to authorize Congress to 
limit the admission of aliens, and to enforce its decisions by removing aliens 
who enter or remain in the United States without federal authorization.  
 
 114 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 115 Id. at 207–08 (“[O]ur cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on 
federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 
U.S. 444, 461 (1978))); cf. id. at 213 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting that the Court’s 
“application [in this case] of the requirement that the condition imposed be reasonably related to 
the purpose for which the funds are expended is cursory and unconvincing”). 
 The underlying spending is also supposed to be invalid if it does not serve the general 
welfare, but this restriction has been utterly toothless, as the Court itself seems to have recognized.  
See id. at 207 & n.2.  The Court has also noted the obvious rule that conditions on federal grants 
may not require a state to do something that would be unconstitutional for the state to do on its 
own, such as violate individual rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 208. 
 Finally, financial inducements offered to the states may not be so coercive that they go 
beyond pressure to compulsion.  Id. at 211.  In NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 519, 580–83, the 
Court held that the threatened loss of more than ten percent of a state’s total budget was a “gun 
to the head” that constituted “economic dragooning.”  The Court provided virtually no 
explanation of where the line might lie between permissibly coercive pressure and impermissibly 
coercive compulsion, and it seems unlikely that Congress will take steps in the immigration area 
that come close to crossing whatever line the Court may someday draw. 
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But that’s about it.116  The Court’s inherent power doctrine, standing alone, 
displaces the police power of the states with respect to the regulation and 
even expulsion of resident aliens in ways that are generally inconsistent with 
the original meaning of the Constitution.  Because there is almost no 
chance that the Court will revive the principles of the Constitution itself, it 
should at least take ameliorative steps akin to those it has taken with respect 
to the Commerce Clause and the spending power. 
Although the three ameliorative doctrines just summarized do not 
necessarily reflect the original meaning of the Constitution,117 they do push 
the outcomes of judicial policymaking in a direction more consistent with 
the original meaning.  For that reason, these existing doctrines should be 
used, and in some cases extended, to minimize the infringements on state 
autonomy made possible by the Court’s misguided immigration 
jurisprudence.  The principles summarized in South Dakota v. Dole, along 
with the anti-commandeering decisions, can readily reduce one form of 
federal overreach.  The Supreme Court should go even further by applying 
Gregory v. Ashcroft’s clear-statement rule in all cases that involve federal 
intrusions on the power of states to regulate aliens within their borders. 
Two examples may be used to illustrate my proposal.  First, states that 
refuse to assist the federal government in enforcing valid federal 
immigration laws are exercising their inherent constitutional right to 
regulate or refrain from regulating aliens as they see fit.  Similarly, other 
states are exercising the same constitutional right when they supplement 
federal efforts to enforce valid federal laws with state regulations that go 
beyond what the federal government has chosen to adopt.  The genuine 
constitutional right of the states to regulate and even expel aliens from their 
territory is much broader, but existing judicial doctrine can easily be 
shaped to recognize at least a modicum of the discretion that the 
Constitution itself leaves with the state governments. 
A.  Sanctuaries 
Many local jurisdictions and some states have adopted so-called 
sanctuary policies under which they refuse, to one degree or another, to 
 
 116 There are no doubt some specific and limited circumstances in which Congress does have 
legitimate grounds for exercising additional powers, such as providing for traditional grants of 
diplomatic immunity and for the expulsion of enemy aliens during time of war. 
 117 See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1960, 1967 
(1993) (collecting evidence that the original meaning of the Constitution permits Congress to 
compel state executive officers to enforce federal law); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling 
Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment 
Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 829, 831, 845, 847 (1999) (criticizing New York and Printz, and 
proposing an alternative rationale for an anti-commandeering doctrine). 
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assist or cooperate with the federal agencies charged with enforcing 
immigration laws.118  Such cooperation generated some controversies in the 
1980s, and federal efforts to enlist state and local agencies in immigration 
enforcement accelerated after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.119  Although these 
efforts slowed in some respects toward the end of the Obama 
Administration, they have been pushed hard again by the Trump 
Administration.  Several rationales have been advanced for sanctuary 
policies, perhaps most importantly that local police can more effectively 
enforce the ordinary criminal law if victims and witnesses are not 
discouraged from cooperating by fear of trouble arising from their 
immigration status.120 
Whatever their merits or shortcomings as law enforcement policies, 
voluntary efforts by local officials to cooperate with the federal government 
are commonplace and perfectly legal.121  Federal efforts to pressure local 
officials to help with immigration enforcement, which intensified in 2017, 
do raise serious issues. Shortly after his inauguration, for example, 
President Trump issued Executive Order 13768, which announced that 
certain federal monies would be withheld from sanctuary jurisdictions.122  
The Administration sought to enforce the Order by imposing new 
conditions on grants in a pre-existing program under which a statutory 
formula specifies how certain funds are to be distributed to state and local 
governments. Henceforth, grant recipients would be required to (1) give 
federal immigration agents access to their jails for law enforcement 
purposes, (2) provide federal authorities with notice of the release date of 
detainees, and (3) certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, a statute that 
prohibits state and local governments from restricting their own agencies 
and employees from sharing immigration information with federal agents. 
A number of jurisdictions quickly brought lawsuits challenging the new 
policy.  So far at least, the Administration has had little or no success in 
defending its position in the courts.  As Trump v. Hawaii should remind us, 
that could change.123  But it shouldn’t.  This enforcement policy is an 
 
 118 See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1736 (2018) 
(reporting that more than 500 sanctuary policies have been collected and posted online). 
 119 Id. at 1719–23. 
 120 Other justifications have included: local control over priorities and resources; avoiding unlawful 
arrests and detentions; complying with equal protection norms; promoting diversity and inclusion; 
and expressing opposition to federal policies.  Id. at 1752–73. 
 121 Under the Criminal Alien Program, for example, which has been operating since the 1980s, 
federal immigration agents are sometimes offered access to local jails in order to investigate the 
inmate population for immigration violations.  Similarly, local officials can be deputized as 
immigration agents under a 1996 amendment to the Immigration and Nationalization Act.  For a 
summary of these and related programs, see id. at 1724–36. 
 122 Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 123 In 2016, candidate Donald Trump called for a ban on admitting Muslims into the country, a 
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unconstitutional effort to use conditional grants as levers for pressuring state 
officials into exercising their police power according to federal dictates. 
First, the statute authorizing the grant program says nothing at all about 
access to jails or notice of release dates, and the Executive should at the 
very least be stopped from imposing conditions that Congress has not itself 
specifically and unambiguously selected.124  The propriety of the exercise of 
such discretion, which is not a settled issue, can and should be resolved by 
the Supreme Court in favor of the states.125  If the Justices were to adopt a 
Gregory-like clear statement rule specifically for the immigration field, this 
and other sound results would easily follow. 
Second, South Dakota v. Dole’s relatedness requirement should be 
enforced much more strictly than it was in Dole itself.  If a city applies for 
money with which to purchase more police cars or train more SWAT 
teams, conditions requiring the police to administer its jails according to 
federal dictates should be disallowed.  If Congress wants local jurisdictions 
to admit its agents to their jails or notify federal agents about the pending 
release of aliens subject to deportation, it should at least be required to do 
so by attaching such conditions to a grant related to the operation of the 
jails.  Here again, a clear-statement rule like Gregory’s would assist in the 
enforcement of the relatedness requirement. 
Third, using a grant condition to secure compliance with Section 1373 
is unconstitutional because the information-sharing statute itself violates the 
anti-commandeering principle.  It prevents state and local governments 
from controlling decisions by their own subordinate officials and employees 
about sharing information, as well as from controlling how these 
 
proposal that was later qualified in some respects.  After a clumsy initial effort to tighten border 
security, President Trump eventually issued a proclamation restricting the entry of people from 
eight countries (most of them with Muslim-majority populations) that his Administration deemed 
insufficiently diligent in collecting and sharing information about their nationals who sought to 
come to the United States.  The Ninth Circuit invalidated the proclamation on the ground that it 
violated two federal statutes.  By a vote of 5-4, however, the Supreme Court reversed; one of the 
statutory provisions at issue gave the President ample discretion to issue the proclamation, while 
the other provision did not even apply to admission decisions.  The Court also rejected the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the proclamation violated the Establishment Clause.  See Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (reversing the lower court’s grant of a preliminary injunction of President 
Trump’s travel ban and remanding the case for further review).  For a more detailed analysis of 
the litigation, see Josh Blackman, The Travel Bans, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29. 
 124 According to a dictum in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950), an 
unfettered right to exclude aliens from the United States “is inherent in the executive power to 
control the foreign affairs of the nation.”  Even if the Court were to so hold, which it has not, such 
a decision would not imply that the Executive has the unilateral power to impose immigration-
related conditions on grants to state and local governments.   
 125 Accord Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (stating that in order for 
Congress to place conditions on a state’s receipt of federal funds, it must do so clearly and 
unambiguously). 
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subordinates use their time.  It liberates state and local employees from the 
laws and policy decisions by which they would otherwise be bound, and 
thus effectively prevents state governments from declining to participate in 
a federal regulatory program.  This conflicts with the fundamental principle 
on which New York v. United States, Printz, and Murphy v. NCAA are based.126 
At the time of this writing, the Trump Administration’s effort to cut off 
funds to “sanctuary jurisdictions” has been enjoined by several courts,127 
and rightly so.  If Congress is serious about enlisting reluctant state and 
local governments to help enforce its immigration laws, it can do so 
through grants that are closely related to the federal program, that have 
unambiguous conditions attached, and that offer funding that is generous 
enough to induce cooperation.  One can debate the wisdom of adopting 
such a policy, as well as whether it is consistent with the original meaning of 
the Constitution.  But if it’s permitted, there really should be no debate 
about the appropriate forum for the policy debate.  This is a decision for 
Congress to make and, until Congress does so, the Executive has no valid 
grounds for interfering with decisions by state and local governments to 
refuse their cooperation.  
B.  Anti-Sanctuaries 
Donald Trump’s campaign for the presidency relied in significant part 
on appeals to voters who wanted more aggressive action to prevent illegal 
immigration and to deport illegal aliens.  That may explain his 
Administration’s decision to attack the sanctuary policies adopted in some 
jurisdictions, but it does not justify measures that short-cut the legally 
 
 126 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000), upheld a federal statute restricting the disclosure of certain 
information either by private parties or by states.  Unlike that statute, Section 1373 does not apply 
evenhandedly to the public and private sectors.  Id. at 143.  Reno does appear to allude in passing 
to a provision permitting, and in some cases requiring, that certain information be disclosed by 
state and local governments.  See Josh Blackman, Sanctuary Cities and the Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 
1373, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Apr. 21, 2017), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/04/21/ 
sanctuary-cities-and-the-constitutionality-of-8-u-s-c-1373/ (pointing out that Reno characterizes 
certain disclosures under the statute in question as mandatory).  But Reno also reconciled its 
decision in that case with the “principles enunciated in New York and Printz” by observing that the 
statute at issue did “not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes 
regulating private individuals.”  528 U.S. at 151.  Under Section 1373, however, state and local 
governments cannot prevent their own employees from assisting in federal law enforcement 
efforts. 
 127 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 288 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(holding that conditions imposed on certain grants pursuant to E.O. 13768 were not authorized 
by statute); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(enjoining enforcement of E.O. 13768 and holding Section 1373 unconstitutional); City of San 
Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924, 973 (N.D. Cal., 2018) (same); City of Chicago v. 
Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (same). 
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appropriate means of doing so.  Federalism, however, should work both 
ways, and the Obama Administration erred in the other direction.  One 
conspicuous mistake was its attack on an Arizona law that sought to protect 
the state by supplementing federal immigration enforcement efforts. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court sustained this assault by the Executive 
on the state’s extremely limited effort to protect herself. 
In Arizona v. United States,128 the federal government challenged four 
provisions of the Arizona statute.  One section made failure to comply with 
federal alien-registration rules a state-law misdemeanor.  The law also 
made it a state misdemeanor for an illegal alien to seek or engage in work 
in Arizona.  A third provision authorized warrantless arrests of anyone 
whom the arresting officer had probable cause to believe had committed an 
offense that made the person deportable.  Finally, the statute required that 
officers who stopped, detained, or arrested a person must in certain 
circumstances (such as when the individual does not have a driver’s license) 
try to verify the person’s immigration status with the federal government. 
The Obama Administration obtained a preliminary injunction against 
the enforcement of all four provisions, which the Supreme Court reviewed. 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion conceded at the outset that a massive 
influx of illegal aliens across the state’s southern border had produced an 
epidemic of serious social problems, including crime, property damage, and 
environmental problems.129  This appears to have resulted, at least in part, 
from a federal decision to concentrate its enforcement resources in 
California and Texas, thus funneling illegal migrants into Arizona.130  All of 
the Justices agreed that the pre-enforcement injunction against the fourth 
provision, which could be interpreted and enforced in ways that would not 
conflict with any federal law, must be lifted.  The majority, however, 
concluded that the other three provisions were preempted by federal 
immigration law.  Three dissenting Justices wrote separate opinions, each 
of which advanced somewhat different arguments. 
The law of preemption is in one respect perfectly clear and in some 
others very murky.  Courts are indisputably required by the Supremacy 
Clause to apply valid federal laws even if there are state laws to the 
contrary. It is much less obvious how courts should go about deciding 
whether a specific state law is preempted by a specific federal law. 
Two categories of preemption are noncontroversial.  Where Congress 
has the authority to regulate, it may expressly preempt the states from 
doing so.  And where there is a conflict that makes it impossible for a 
 
 128 567 U.S. 387, 392–93 (2012). 
 129 Id. at 397–98. 
 130 Id. at 434 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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regulated party to comply with both a federal and state law, federal law 
must be followed. 
Two other categories developed by the courts raise more difficult 
questions.  Field preemption is invoked when a court concludes that 
Congress has regulated a specific field so thoroughly that it presumably 
would not want its regulations supplemented by any state laws.  Obstacle 
preemption is found when a court thinks that a state law may frustrate or 
undermine the full achievement of what the court believes to be the 
purpose of a federal law.  Not surprisingly, field preemption and obstacle 
preemption cases dominate the case law with obstacle preemption having 
become particularly pervasive.131  These two statutory construction 
doctrines require courts to make educated guesses about what Congress 
would have said about questions that its statutes do not address, and the 
applications are highly context-dependent.132  Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Arizona illustrates how far field preemption and obstacle 
preemption can be pushed, and the disparate dissenting opinions show that 
there is no consensus on an alternative approach. 
The Court concluded that the new misdemeanor for violating the 
federal registration statute, which provided slightly different penalties than 
those found in federal law, was preempted because Congress has impliedly 
occupied the field of alien registration regulations.133  The majority 
emphasized the possibility that Arizona might prosecute some individuals 
whom federal officers would choose not to prosecute but did not explain 
why this would necessarily conflict with federal law.134 
The Court also held that the provision creating a new misdemeanor for 
unauthorized employment activities by aliens was barred by a federal 
statute that expressly preempted states from penalizing employers for such 
 
 131 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur recent cases have frequently rejected field pre-emption in the 
absence of statutory language expressly requiring it.”). 
 132 Although application of the doctrine is a matter of statutory construction, the basis for 
preemption lies in the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.  One might therefore think that courts 
should look to the original meaning of that Clause in order to discover how statutes should be 
construed.  For one effort to do so, see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 231–32 
(2000) (arguing that neither obstacle preemption nor a practice of narrowly construing federal 
statutes in order to avoid preemption is consistent with the original meaning of the Supremacy 
Clause).  Justice Thomas has adopted this view, which has been criticized as unworkable in the 
modern world by at least one commentator.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 582–604 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the Court’s sweeping approach to 
preemption is inconsistent with the Constitution); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2013) (discussing Justice Thomas’s textualist approach to preemption and 
its influence on the Supreme Court). 
 133 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 403. 
 134 Id. at 402. 
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immigration violations.135  The federal statute is silent about state penalties 
on aliens who seek or accept employment, and the Court did not explain 
why Congress would expressly preempt the one category and impliedly 
preempt the other.  Instead, the majority simply asserted that Congress had 
created a balance that would be upset by the Arizona law.136 
The Court also rejected Arizona’s authorization for the warrantless 
arrest of individuals based on probable cause that they are eligible for 
deportation.137 This, said the majority, created an obstacle to achieving 
congressional purposes because it was not among the ways in which the 
federal government has specifically authorized state officials to act as 
immigration officers.138 
Compared with the other dissenters, Justice Alito’s disagreements with 
the majority were relatively limited.  He agreed that the alien-registration 
provision was preempted because he thought the issue had been decided in 
a 1941 precedent.139  On the other hand, he disagreed with the majority on 
the employment regulation, largely because he thought it should be upheld 
under a 1976 precedent.140  Justice Alito could find nothing in the purposes 
of the federal statutes that would be frustrated when state officials detain 
criminal aliens whom the federal government itself is required by law to 
take into custody, and he would therefore have upheld the warrantless 
arrest provision.141  
Justice Scalia’s elaborate and sharply worded dissent began by 
accepting the shift from the Commerce Clause to international law and the 
inherent power theory: 
I accept [the extensive federal immigration law that now exists] as a 
valid exercise of federal power—not because of the Naturalization Clause 
(it has no necessary connection to citizenship) but because it is an inherent 
attribute of sovereignty no less for the United States than for the States.  As 
this Court has said, it is an “accepted maxim of international law, that 
every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its 
dominions.” That is why there was no need to set forth control of 
immigration as one of the enumerated powers of Congress . . . .142 
 
 
 135 Id. at 406. 
 136 Id.  
 137 Id. at 403. 
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. at 441 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52 (1941)). 
 140 Id. (citing DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)). 
 141 Id. at 457. 
 142 Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)). 
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If the reasoning in this supposedly originalist argument were sound, it 
would follow that all attributes of sovereignty that are recognized in 
international law are inherent in the federal government and need not have 
been enumerated in the Constitution.  But the Constitution enumerates 
some, and only some, of those attributes.  Why some but not others, and 
why these particular attributes?  Rather than address this obvious question, 
Justice Scalia asserted that the states have retained the sovereign 
prerogative to regulate immigration except to the extent that their laws 
conflict with the exercise of what he considers an inherent attribute of 
sovereignty possessed by the federal government.143   But how is this more 
than a bare assertion? 
Instead of making an effort to interpret the text of the Constitution, 
Justice Scalia maintained that the only question in the case was whether 
any federal statutes unequivocally abrogated Arizona’s inherent sovereign 
power over immigration, apparently because he thought that state power 
over immigration is analogous to state sovereign immunity.144  In the 
sovereign immunity context, however, the Court has found that abrogation 
is permitted only on the basis of powers specifically granted to Congress 
after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.145  The requirement of 
unequivocal abrogation in that context “arises from a recognition of the 
important role played by the Eleventh Amendment and the broader 
principles that it reflects.”146  There is no analogous textual basis for Scalia’s 
inherent-sovereignty theory.  Practically everything governments do can be 
conceptualized as a manifestation of an inherent attribute of sovereignty, 
which does nothing to determine whether a given power was given 
exclusively or concurrently to Congress or left entirely with the states.  
Justice Scalia treats authority over immigration as a concurrent power and 
says that Congress must unequivocally express a determination to abrogate 
the states’ power to control immigration.147  Justice Scalia’s novel theory 
about concurrent inherent powers is little more than an ipse dixit, and so is 
his demand for a rule requiring what he calls unequivocal abrogation. 
For Justice Thomas, this case required only a straightforward 
application of his understanding of the original meaning of the Supremacy 
Clause, which he had adopted outside the immigration context several 
years earlier.148  In his view, the Constitution limits preemption to cases 
where the ordinary meaning of the texts of a federal and state law conflict 
 
 143 Id. at 422. 
 144 Id. at 423 (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)). 
 145 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
 146 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55–56. 
 147 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 423 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 148 Id. at 437 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
1022 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:4 
with each other.149  Under that rule, none of the four Arizona provisions 
were preempted, whether or not there was any tension with purposes that 
might be attributed to the federal immigration statutes.150 
Justice Thomas’s understanding of the Supremacy Clause would go a 
long way toward protecting the states from inappropriate federal intrusions 
on their regulatory authority over aliens.  But because his theory sweeps far 
beyond the immigration context, it has implications that will make its 
adoption by the Court unlikely. 
Justice Scalia’s approach would have effects similar to Justice Thomas’s 
in the immigration context, but his adoption of the inherent power theory 
renders his position untethered to the original meaning of the Constitution.  
That, in turn, means that the rule he adopts is unlikely to appeal to those 
who think originalism requires arguments and evidence about original 
meaning rather than ipse dixits.151 
Justice Alito’s approach, with its reliance on his interpretation of the 
Court’s precedents, would tend to continue producing the kind of 
fluctuating results that have been observed since the Court left the original 
meaning of the Constitution behind.  At several points, Alito invokes 
precedents requiring that courts find a “clear and manifest” purpose to 
preempt in areas traditionally regulated by the states.152  If a majority of 
Justices took such a rule seriously, as Justice Alito did in this case, the effect 
might be comparable to what we could expect from Justice Thomas’s 
approach.  As Justice Kennedy’s opinion vividly demonstrates, however, it 
is very easy for judges to find that something is clear and manifest on the 
basis of little or no evidence.153  The Gregory canon would be more difficult 
to evade, both in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts, and is 
therefore superior to Justice Alito’s approach. 
Gregory also shows how a majority of Justices might agree on a way to 
reduce the damage to federalism arising from the inherent power theory. 
The first step would be for the Court to acknowledge that this theory is 
extremely dubious, even though it is so well-settled that judicial prudence 
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may counsel against its repudiation.  The Court could then adopt Gregory’s 
canon of construction, which accomplishes what is most needed in the 
immigration area: the prevention of inadvertent congressional 
infringements on state prerogatives as well as unauthorized infringements 
carried out by executive agencies and judges acting in the name of 
Congress.  When the Constitution has been construed to strip from the 
states their legal protection against intrusive exercises of congressional 
power, the Court “must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such 
an exercise” before interpreting a statute to do so.154  In other words, “it 
must be plain to anyone reading” the federal statute that it preempts state 
law.155 
Gregory was a 5-4 decision made possible when Justice Souter replaced 
Justice Brennan, who had been a member of the 5-4 majority in Garcia. 
Arizona v. United States was a 5-3 decision in a case from which Justice Kagan 
was recused.  If we assume that she would likely have voted with the 
majority, Justice Kennedy’s resignation means that the Court may be only 
one more retirement away from having five Justices who would be willing 
to apply the Gregory canon in the immigration area.  If that were to happen, 
the Supreme Court could visibly treat contentious issues like sanctuary 
policies and state efforts to reduce the social costs of illegal immigration 
with an even hand. 
In light of the intensity that has come to permeate the political debates 
about immigration, the appeal of such visible evenhandedness might even 
persuade Chief Justice Roberts that the Arizona approach is not in the long 
run interest of the Court as an institution.  He seems to be extremely 
touchy about the Court’s political reputation, which is not surprising in the 
leader of what will be known to history as the Roberts Court.  It is not 
inconceivable that he might be persuaded that the Gregory approach would 
offer more protection for the Court’s reputation than the ferocious 
disregard for state interests in the Arizona majority opinion.  So perhaps the 
Court need not even wait for another retirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution sets forth a pretty clear allocation of power over 
immigration between the state and federal governments.  The Foreign 
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to exclude aliens from the United 
States as it sees fit, to expel those who violate exclusion laws, and to enact 
uniform naturalization laws.  The states retain a residual authority to 
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regulate aliens who reside within their borders and to expel unwanted 
aliens from their own territory. 
The Supreme Court has rejected the Constitution’s allocation of power 
in favor of a judicially invented theory that attributes to the federal 
government a very broad inherent authority over aliens.  This doctrine is 
almost certainly so well-settled that the Court will cling to it no matter how 
problematic it is as an interpretation of the Constitution and no matter how 
many practical problems it creates. 
The Court has faced a similar problem arising from its latitudinarian 
interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause.  In that context, the 
Justices have developed several ameliorative doctrines, including the anti-
commandeering principle of New York v. United States and its progeny, as well 
as the clear-statement rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft.  The same doctrines can and 
should be applied in the immigration area. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine should and likely will be used to 
blunt the Trump Administration’s efforts to force state and local 
governments to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.  
Unfortunately, the Court has already established an important precedent, 
Arizona v. United States, that unnecessarily and inappropriately interprets 
existing statutes to preempt the states from protecting their own interests in 
the face of federal underenforcement of the immigration laws.  That 
approach should be repudiated and replaced with a clear-statement rule 
that allows the states to reinforce federal law enforcement unless they are 
forbidden to do so by an express or absolutely unambiguous statutory 
command. 
